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Abstract
The paper develops a New Keynesian Small Open Economy Model charac-
terized by external habit formation and Calvo price setting with dynamic
in￿ ation updating. The model is used to analyze the e⁄ect of nominal ex-
change rate targeting on optimal policy and impulse responses. It is found
that even moderate exchange rate concerns are capable of changing both sign
and magnitude of the optimal instrument response to variables, and that
whether the concern is with respect to the level or ￿rst di⁄erence has much
impact on monetary policy. Also, the cost of exchange rate stabilization in
terms of output and in￿ ation is evident in the model, and impulse responses
under moderate exchange rate targeting are not simple combinations of those
under a ￿ oat and a regime that cares almost only for meeting the exchange
rate target.
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11 Introduction
In recent years, it has come to attention that many countries, though announcing
￿ exible exchange rate regimes, actually do intervene considerably to stabilize their
exchange rate. These interventions imply a concern for exchange rate stabilization
which generally arises from a desire to lower exchange rate risk and transaction costs,
and for very open economies also from the pass through to CPI-in￿ ation. Concerns
are especially strong for emerging markets, where depreciations tend to be contrac-
tionary, increase service on foreign debt, and adversely a⁄ect credit market access.
However, Calvo and Reinhart (2000) documents how "fear of ￿ oating" prevails even
among some developed countries.1
With a clear motivation for exchange rate concerns, several papers2 have joined
the quest of understanding whether open economy Central Banks should stabilize
the exchange rate under an optimal policy. This paper turns the table around and
asks: Given that a country "fears ￿ oating" as documented above, what are the
e⁄ects on monetary policy and the economy?
The question is answered for a small open economy in￿ ation targeting Central
Bank. The regime is highly relevant as it has been adopted by several countries, in-
cluding Sweden, New Zealand, Canada, the UK, Finland, Brazil, Chile, and Colom-
bia. Under ￿ exible in￿ ation targeting, the Central Bank is given independence to
pursue the goals set out in the loss function. A high degree of transparency and
accountability furthermore characterizes the regime. This allows the Central Bank
to use all available information to achieve its goals, and makes clear to the public
the objectives of monetary policy.
The main contribution of the paper is hence to demonstrate how the inclusion
of nominal exchange rates in the Central Bank loss function a⁄ects the economy.
This way of modelling "fear of ￿ oating" seems natural: The loss function re￿ ects the
1Also Reinhart and Rogo⁄ (2002) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) classify exchange
rate regimes on a defacto (as opposed to a dejure) basis.
2See for instance Benigno and Benigno (2004), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001), (2002), Mona-
celli (2003) and Taylor (2000).
2speci￿c objectives of monetary policy, and if they include a concern for exchange
rate swings, then so should the loss function. The weight attached to exchange
rate objectives is easily adjusted to re￿ ect any level of importance relative to other
objectives such as output and in￿ ation stabilization. Finally, the inclusion of ex-
change rate objectives in the loss function increases transparency (by making clear
those objectives to the public) and credibility (by explaining policy changes aimed
at lowering exchange rate volatility).
In addition, the paper o⁄ers a tractable framework with an improved modelling
of the foreign economy for determining the impact on a small country of targeting
a range of variables in a ￿ exible in￿ ation targeting regime. This improved setting
turns out to be necessary under risk sharing.
The exposition is made within a dynamic general equilibrium model with micro-
foundations, and the optimal policy is determined using the Recursive Saddlepoint
Method of Marcet and Marimon. Two types of "fear of ￿ oating"- arising due to con-
cerns about respectively the level and the ￿rst di⁄erence of the nominal exchange
rate- are described and compared to both a completely ￿ exible exchange rate, a peg,
and a policy which is e⁄ectively aimed only at smoothing the nominal exchange rate.
The paper then considers implications for optimal policy and impulse responses from
a shock to the world interest rate.
Turning to the relevant literature, the investigation of monetary policy aspects in
economies under in￿ uence of the rest of the world has led to a large expansion in the
so-called New Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM) literature. Contributions
within the ￿eld are generally characterized by a dynamic general equilibrium frame-
work with micro foundations and real and/or nominal rigidities causing monetary
policy to have short run real e⁄ects.
Most closely related to the model of the current paper is the work by Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler (2001); Gali and Monacelli (2005), and Svensson (2000). The
two former share the basic structure of the model including risk sharing. However,
they exhibit simpler dynamics than the current model due to the absence of habit
3formation and in￿ ation updating. This enables the reduction of the models to the
standard canonical form of the closed economy,3 allowing the qualitative results
from that case to carry over to the open economy. In particular, Clarida, Gali,
and Gertler (2001) demonstrates the optimality of targeting domestic in￿ ation and
the output gap only, while in Gali and Monacelli (2005), a domestic in￿ ation based
Taylor rule dominates both a peg and a CPI-based Taylor rule in all simulations.
Svensson (2000) uses a similar model with richer dynamics (but with foreign
variables following an AR(1) process) to compare strict and ￿ exible domestic and
CPI-in￿ ation targeting to Taylor rules. As in the current paper, the comparison is
carried out by solving for the optimal policy subject to the full rational expectations
model and looking at impulse responses. Only discretionary policy is considered. It
is found that when the policymaker cares for real activity in addition to the level of
in￿ ation, CPI-in￿ ation targeting is a good alternative.
Finally, a part of the NOEM literature deals more explicitly with emerging mar-
ket economies. Models are augmented with speci￿c features of emerging markets
(such as ￿nancial vulnerability and balance sheet e⁄ects) to better understand the
special importance of exchange rates in these economies. Contributions in the area
include CØspedes, Chang, and Velasco (2004) and Mor￿n and Winkelried (2005).
The paper is organized as follows: section II presents the model, and section III
discusses monetary policy objectives. The solution method is brie￿ y explained in
section IV. Section V describes optimal policy under commitment, and section VI
presents impulse responses following a shock to the foreign interest rate. Finally,
section VII summarizes the results and proposes some avenues for further research.
2 The Model
A New Keynesian model of a Small Open Economy is augmented with external
habit formation and Calvo staggered price setting with dynamic in￿ ation updating
in order to ensure inertia in both consumption and in￿ ation.
3That is, a New Keynesian Phillipscurve and an IS curve.
4The model builds on Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001), (2002). There are two
countries, Home and Foreign, with Home being a small open economy and Foreign
representing the rest of the world. As in Gali and Monacelli (1999), the foreign
economy is modelled as a limiting case of the small open economy with negligible
openness. The economies are otherwise symmetric, each consisting of a continuum of
households normalized to [0;1] and intermediate and ￿nal good ￿rms. The former
supply labour in an imperfectly competitive labour market, receive wages and a
lump sum transfer, and buy and consume the ￿nal good. Intermediate good ￿rms
use labour as the only input to produce for the ￿nal good ￿rms, which combine
a continuum of intermediate goods into a single consumption composite that is
sold under perfect competition. For simplicity, only ￿nal goods are traded between
countries, and there is immediate pass-through. An assumption of complete asset
markets closes the model.
2.1 Households

























, and Njt is the amount of labour supplied by household
j in period t. The utility function exhibits external habit formation as measured by
the parameter h; large h indicates strong habits. Average consumption is taken for
granted by all households when optimizing.
Household consumption, Cjt, is composed of Home (CjHt ) and Foreign (CjFt)






where ￿ 2 [0;1] measures the degree of openness of the economy with the approxi-
mately closed foreign economy having ￿ = 0.
5For simplicity, assume that asset markets are complete.4 Let Dt+1 denote the
random payo⁄ at time t + 1 of a portfolio bought at time t, and let Qt;t+1 be the
corresponding stochastic discount factor. From cost minimization, the consumer
price index is given by
Pt = ￿











where PHt is the domestic price of the domestically produced ￿nal good, PFt the
domestic price of the foreign ￿nal good, and St the terms of trade (￿ PFt=PHt, the
relative price of imports in the home country). The wage of household j at time
t is denoted Wjt. Finally, the overall lump sum transfer to household j is given
by Tjt, representing government net transfers as well as accrued pro￿ts from the
monopolistically competitive intermediate good ￿rms.
With this notation in place, the budget constraint of the representative household
is
PtCjt + Et (Qt;t+1Dj;t+1) = WjtNjt + Djt + Tjt (4)
The optimization is furthermore subject to the intermediate good ￿rms￿demand for







where ￿t > 1 is the elasticity of demand for the labour services of worker j (assumed










and Nt is per capita employment.
4See Schmit-Grohe and Uribe (2003) for alternative ways of closing small open economy models:
5The exogenous process is assumed for simplicity as an alternative to modelling fully the frictions
(for instance e¢ ciency wages) causing the time variation in ￿t.
6Expenditure minimization given Cjt determines the domestic demand for domes-
tic and foreign goods as












Finally, the optimal choice of consumption, labour, and portfolio of each household
yields the ￿rst order conditions
Wjt
Pt




























markets are complete, consumption is identical across consumers so that Cjt = Ct 8
j. Flexible wages ensure that also Wjt = Wt and Njt = Nt 8 j, so that equations (9)
and (10) hold in the aggregate as well as for each household. Symmetric conditions
hold in the rest of the world.
Complete asset markets furthermore guarantee that (10) holds for each possible
state in period t+1 instead of in expectations only. Let eit be the nominal interest
rate in the economy. Then EtQt;t+1 = 1
eit, and taking expectations of (10) for foreign




t + Et￿et+1 (11)
with et being the (log) nominal exchange rate, and it (i￿
t) the nominal yield on a
riskless one period discount bond which pays one unit of domestic (foreign) currency
in period t + 1.
2.2 Firms
2.2.1 Final goods sector
The ￿nal goods sector is perfectly competitive and assumed able to adjust prices
immediately without costs. Firms in the sector use a continuum of intermediate











where ￿ > 1, Yt (f) is the input of intermediate goods from ￿rm f 2 [0;1], and Yt
is (aggregate) output. Pro￿t maximization along with perfect competition on the
















2.2.2 Intermediate goods sector
The monopolistically competitive intermediate good ￿rms use labour as the sole
input, and produce according to the linear production function
Yt (f) = AtNt (f) (15)
where Yt (f) is output of ￿rm f, At is productivity assumed to follow an exogenous












Cost minimization by the intermediate good ￿rms yields the labour demand function
(5) used in the household optimization problem as well as the wage index (6). The











While prices of the consumption composite and wages are perfectly ￿ exible, the
intermediate good ￿rms set prices on a staggered basis following Guillermo Calvo
8(1983). Let (1 ￿ ￿) be the probability of a given ￿rm adjusting its price (PHt (f)) in
each period, and assume that if a ￿rm f is not allowed to change its price in period
t, PH;t￿1 (f) is updated according to PHt (f) = PH;t￿1 (f) ￿ ￿t￿1 with ￿t￿1 being














subject to the downward sloping demand curve facing each intermediate good pro-
ducer (13), and with
￿tk ￿
￿
￿t ￿ ￿t+1 ￿ ::: ￿ ￿t+k￿1 for k ￿ 1
1 for k = 0























￿t￿1 + ￿mct (19)
where in￿ ation is log domestic in￿ ation measured in deviation from steady state
(= 0), ￿ ￿
(1￿￿)(1￿￿￿)
￿(1+￿) , and mct is log deviation from steady state real marginal cost
(which is also zero).
For future reference, note that when prices are ￿ exible, ￿ = 0, the ￿rst order








which is the standard result that the producer sets his real price as a markup on
real marginal cost.
6A more detailed derivation is available in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001).
92.3 Equilibrium relations
In equilibrium, consumption is divided between domestic and foreign goods accord-
ing to
ct = (1 ￿ ￿)cHt + ￿cFt (21)
where lowercase variables are in log deviations from steady state. This is the sense
in which ￿ measures the degree of openness of the economy. Letting cH￿
t denote con-
sumption of domestic goods in the foreign economy, goods market clearing implies
yt = (1 ￿ ￿)cHt + ￿c
H￿
t (22)
By (8), import demand is
cFt = ct ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)st (23)
= cHt ￿ st
while by (7), domestic demand for domestic goods is
cHt = ct + ￿st (24)
Because the two economies are symmetric in all aspects except for their degree
of openness, c￿
t = y￿






t + st (25)
The relation makes it clear how disturbances to foreign output a⁄ect export demand
directly.
Combining the above equilibrium relations gives us consumption as a function














Because of the assumption of complete markets, the ￿rst order condition (10) holds
exactly for each state of the world at all times instead of in expectations only. This is
true for both the domestic and foreign economy. Combining the two Euler equations,
assuming that the law of one price holds,7 and de￿ning the real exchange rate
qt ￿ et + p
￿
t ￿ pt (27)
= (1 ￿ ￿)st















While the standard risk sharing result depends on the terms of trade alone, this
model exhibits additional dependence on past consumption in both countries due to
habit formation; the standard result is recovered when h = 0.
2.3.2 Flex Price Equilibrium
In the ￿ ex price equilibrium, ￿rms are free to set a new price every period, and it
follows from (20) that (log) marginal cost is zero. As in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(2002), let the wage markup be ￿xed at its steady state value in the ￿ ex price
equilibrium - as noted in their paper, this makes sense if the wage markup represents
unmodelled wage rigidities. Assume in addition that the ￿ ex price equilibrium is
conditional on foreign output and all past variables. Then combining the ￿rst order
condition for labour (9) with the log-linearized production function (yt = at + nt),
the equilibrium relation (26), and the expression for marginal cost (17), one obtains
7Assuming the law of one price is a simpli￿cation which hardly holds true empirically. See
Monacelli (2003) for a New Keynesian Small Open Economy model with Calvo price setting and
imperfect pass through, and LindØ, NessØn, and S￿derstr￿m (2004) for a model with imperfect
￿nancial integration and gradual pass through. Flamini (2003) analyzes the e⁄ect of imperfect
pass-through on the transmission of CPI-in￿ ation targeting optimal monetary policy.
11the following expression for ￿ ex price output yt
mct = 0 ) (29)
yt =
(1 ￿ ￿)(’ + 1)
’(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿
at +
￿￿





1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (2 ￿ ￿)









t￿1 ￿ ￿ (2 ￿ ￿)st￿1
￿
where mct and st denote ￿ ex price values of respectively marginal cost and terms of
trade. The expression that determines st is derived from the risk sharing condition















￿h(￿ ￿ 1)(2 ￿ ￿)
￿1
st￿1 (30)
with ￿1 ￿ ￿ (2 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1) + 1.


















Due to external habit formation in consumption, it is not possible to rewrite the
model in the standard canonical form of the closed economy. However, one can come
close by rewriting the model as an IS and AS curve for each economy combined with
a terms of trade (or risk sharing) equation.
To obtain the IS-curve, combine the Euler equation (10) with (26) and let ￿0 ￿




























(it ￿ Et￿t+1 ￿ ￿Et￿st+1)








￿0 (it ￿ Et￿t+1), making it clear how the Central Bank is able to in￿ uence output
immediately through the e⁄ect of the nominal interest rate on the real rate.
When the economy opens up, the direct response of output to interest rate
changes is reduced. Expected and current foreign output and terms of trade growth
comes to in￿ uence output too, the former through exports/imports, the latter
through the exchange rate channel: Lines 2 and 3 capture the indirect e⁄ect through
consumption while expected terms of trade growth in the 4th line is due to its e⁄ect
on expected CPI-in￿ ation alone.
The Phillips curve follows from (19) using the log linearized marginal cost equa-
tion (17) along with the ￿rst order condition for labour, the log linearized production
function (yt = at + nt), the equilibrium condition (26), and the ￿ ex price values of

















￿ (2 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿
￿
(st ￿ st) + ￿￿
w
t
As in the closed economy, in￿ ation increases when output exceeds its ￿ ex price level,
or when there is a shock to the stochastic wage markup (cost push shock). What
is di⁄erent is that domestic in￿ ation is seen to respond stronger to variations in
the (domestic) output gap when the economy is open (￿ > 0): The e⁄ect working
through employment is una⁄ected by the degree of openness, but the response work-
13ing through consumption is not. This is due to some of the goods produced being
exported.
Terms of trade now enters the Phillips curve with a positive or negative coe¢ cient
depending on the parameter ￿: The positive e⁄ect is through the direct e⁄ect on
CPI-in￿ ation changing the labour/leisure trade o⁄ in (9) while the negative e⁄ect
works indirectly through consumption, cf (26). Finally, due to in￿ ation updating of
prices, the long run Phillipscurve is vertical.
The Central Bank is able to a⁄ect in￿ ation immediately through the real interest
rate, with the e⁄ect of policy working through the aggregate demand channel. An
interest rate change is furthermore bound to change in￿ ation expectations, which
again a⁄ects in￿ ation directly through optimal price setting of intermediate ￿rms￿
products. This is the expectations channel of monetary policy.8
Though not immediately evident from (33), foreign output also has an immediate
e⁄ect on in￿ ation through export demand and consumption. Hence disturbances in
the foreign economy a⁄ect in￿ ation at once with the e⁄ect entering through the ￿ ex
price values of domestic output and terms of trade.
The equation determining the terms of trade as a function of output and past















h(￿ ￿ 1)(2 ￿ ￿)￿
￿1
st￿1 (34)
Terms of trade is seen to exhibit serial dependence due to habit formation in con-
sumption, and is in addition determined by current and past relative output with
an increase in the former causing a real depreciation of the domestic currency. The
inclusion of this equation and its ￿ exprice counterpart in the model is what makes a
di⁄erence from the standard model which emphasizes an isomorphism between the
open and closed economy. In those models, the openness of the economy changes
8The immediate e⁄ect of monetary policy on output and in￿ ation facilitates the solution of the
model and is used for simplicity. More realistically, one could impose that output and in￿ ation is
predetermined (in the sense of having exogenous forecast errors) with monetary policy having a
faster e⁄ect on output than in￿ ation. See for instance Svensson (2000).
14only the coe¢ cients in the canonical form.9
Finally, the foreign economy is symmetric except that it is approximately closed
so that ￿ = 0. For simplicity, I let the foreign Central Bank follow a Taylor rule
(Taylor (1993)) with standard coe¢ cients, and allow for a policy shock by adding
a zero-mean iid error term "￿



























































































The Taylor rule applied is sophisticated in two ways; it depends on the current
natural interest rate (rather than its long run average), and it reacts to current
as opposed to past in￿ ation and output gap. An important implication is that
di￿
t
d"i;t 6= 1. Rather, the change in the foreign interest rate brought about by a policy
shock causes a change in output and in￿ ation which again a⁄ects the interest rate.
The system of equations in (35) above gives the equilibrium relation.
The model is closed by assuming stationary AR(1) processes for the stochastic





















9For instance Clarida, Gali, Gertler (2001) ￿nd that the terms of trade is proportional to current
relative output. It is therefore easy to substitute out the terms of trade from the model. See also
Clarida, Gali, Gertler (2002) and Gali and Monacelli (2005).
15where all coe¢ cients are nonnegative and less than unity, and the shocks zero-mean
iid.
To summarize, the model consists of (32)￿(34), the domestic ￿ ex price equilib-
rium (29)￿(31), the foreign economy (35), and the AR(1) processes for productivity
and the stochastic wage markup (36).
3 Policy Objective
The paper considers variants of ￿ exible in￿ ation targeting with the Central Bank





t = ￿t + ￿￿st by (3)
￿
, and nominal exchange rate changes
and levels:















+ ￿y (yt ￿ yt)
2 + ￿￿e (et ￿ et￿1)
2 + ￿e (et ￿ e)
2
￿
where ￿ is the Central Bank discount factor, assumed equal to the subjective dis-
count factor of consumers. A di⁄erent weight (￿￿) is attached to each term in the
period loss function to re￿ ect the relative importance for the monetary policy au-
thority of the relevant targets being met, and the overall function is scaled by (1 ￿ ￿)
to make it a weighted average of expected losses in all future periods. e, the target
for the level of the nominal exchange rate, is set to zero. (37) demonstrates the
explicit objectives for monetary policy.
The main contribution of the paper is to show how the inclusion of the nominal
exchange rate in the monetary policy objectives a⁄ects the economy. It turns out
that whether the desired exchange rate stabilization relates to the level or ￿rst
di⁄erence of the nominal rate matters a good deal for policy and hence for the
implied dynamics of the economy. To illustrate these di⁄erences, both the change
in and level of the nominal rate have been included in (37).
As argued in the introduction, there are several reasons why targeting the nom-
inal exchange rate may be desirable. This is especially so for emerging market
16economies where exchange rate movements heavily a⁄ecting CPI-in￿ ation, foreign
debt service, and market access gives reason to "fear of ￿ oating" in addition to more
general considerations such as lowering exchange rate risks and transaction costs.
Also, empirics show that many countries actively try to manage their exchange rate
in some way. It is therefore important to understand the economic trade-o⁄s in-
volved in doing so, as well as to compare moderate exchange rate interventions to
regimes where the exchange rate is close to being the sole policy objective.
The remaining terms in the loss function are standard: CPI targeting (as opposed
to domestic in￿ ation targeting) is the norm among in￿ ation targeting countries, and
output is targeted at its ￿ exprice level.10 Having both CPI-in￿ ation and nomi-
nal exchange rate depreciation in the loss function is redundant to the extent that
CPI-in￿ ation is a linear combination of in￿ ation of domestic and imported goods.
However, both objectives are here included because of their relevance from the pol-
icymaker￿ s point of view. It is assumed throughout that ￿cpi = 1 and ￿y = 0:5.
To illustrate the e⁄ects of nominal exchange rate targeting, the paper considers
￿ve di⁄erent loss functions: 1) A pure ￿ oat, 2) A peg, 3) Heavy smoothing, 4)
Moderate stabilization, and 5) Moderate smoothing.
1) is modelled as the small open economy targeting only in￿ ation and output,
ie all other weights in the loss function are zero. Note that the ￿ oat is not pure in
the sense that the exchange rate drifts on its own, una⁄ected by monetary policy.
Rather, interest rate changes a⁄ect the exchange rate, but due to the form of the
loss-function, policy-makers are only concerned with these changes insofar they a⁄ect
output and in￿ ation. Because of free international capital mobility, monetary policy
and exchange rate policy can no longer be distinguished.
2) is modelled by attaching a very large weight (￿e = 100) to the term (et ￿ e)
2,
so that the Central Bank is e⁄ectively concerned only with keeping e = e = 0. 3)
is modelled with a similarly large weight on the term (et ￿ et￿1)
2. The remaining
two cases represent "fear of ￿ oating" with a moderate concern for exchange rate
10The general form of the loss function and solution method allows for other targets to be easily
added, corresponding to for instance interest rate smoothing or real exchange rate concerns.
17targeting. 4) and 5) are therefore modelled as having respectively ￿e = 0:5 and
￿￿e = 0:5. This corresponds to caring as much about the nominal exchange rate
target as the output target.
4 Solution Method
The model is solved numerically using the Recursive Saddlepoint Method of Marcet
and Marimon as described in Svensson (2005). This solution method reformulates
the non-recursive problem of minimizing the loss function (37) subject to the model
equations for the home and foreign economy into a recursive problem which can be
solved using standard methods. The appendix shows the model in its state space
form along with the matrices de￿ning the loss function and a brief explanation of
the solution method under commitment.
Parameters are set to reasonable values as follows: In the utility function, a
fairly strong external habit formation with h = 0:9, and a labour supply elasticity
of 1/3 (’ = 3) is assumed. Sigma is set to 7. The discount factor of the utility and
loss functions are set equal at a value of 0:99 corresponding to an annual riskless
return of 4% in steady state when time is measured in quarters. The stochastic wage
markup has parameter ￿￿ = 0:5 in the AR(1) process. Letting ￿rms set new prices
once a year on average, and using the calibration of productivity from Gali and
Monacelli (2005), I set ￿ = 0:75 and ￿a = 0:66. The economy is assumed fairly open
with ￿ = 0:4, and as already mentioned the ￿ exible in￿ ation targeting loss function
gives weights of 1 on CPI-in￿ ation, and 0:5 on output deviations from ￿ exprice level
always. In addition, some positive weight is associated with nominal exchange rate
targeting depending on the regime considered.
5 Optimal Policy
Under commitment, the Central Bank is able to credibly bind itself to a state contin-
gent policy and hence solve the optimization problem once and for all in the initial
18period.11 The case is interesting as its solution gives us the optimal policy function,
the optimal way to conduct policy given the goals set out in the loss function. It is
hence possible to understand better the e⁄ects of exchange rate targeting under the
best possible conditions for monetary policy.
This section addresses the optimal policy function under the ￿ve alternative spec-
i￿cations of the loss function presented above: 1) A pure ￿ oat, 2) A peg, 3) Heavy
smoothing, 4) Moderate stabilization, and 5) Moderate smoothing. For compari-
son, the reaction coe¢ cients in the optimal instrument rule under these alternative
speci￿cations are presented in Table 1.12
Speci￿cation 1 2 3 4 5
Loss function ￿ ￿e = 100 ￿￿e = 100 ￿e = 0:5 ￿￿e = 0:5
et￿1 ￿0:0000 0:2362 ￿0:0000 ￿0:1630 ￿0:0000
i￿
t￿1 0 0 0 0 0
￿t￿1 0:1339 ￿0:0230 ￿0:0219 0:0238 0:0863
yt￿1 ￿0:0261 ￿0:0696 ￿0:0716 ￿0:0019 ￿0:0555
st￿1 ￿0:1467 ￿0:1018 ￿0:1031 ￿0:0892 ￿0:1396
yt￿1 0 0 0 0 0
￿￿
t￿1 0:2533 0:8362 0:8296 0:7598 0:4202
y￿
t￿1 2:8997 3:1054 3:1121 2:8461 3:0198
at ￿0:0234 0:0968 0:1002 ￿0:0452 0:0438
￿w
t 0:0028 ￿0:0180 ￿0:0178 ￿0:0128 ￿0:0035
￿￿w
t ￿0:0013 0:1382 0:1371 0:1119 0:0425
"￿
i;t 0:5758 0:6126 0:6141 0:5552 0:5983
y￿
t ￿3:9414 ￿4:2419 ￿4:2506 ￿3:8869 ￿4:1095
l1 ￿0:0000 ￿0:0000 ￿0:0000 0:0000 ￿0:0000
l2 ￿0:0000 ￿0:0000 ￿0:0000 0:0000 ￿0:0000
l3 ￿0:0172 0:0010 ￿0:0006 0:0334 ￿0:0210
l4 0:0524 0:0013 0:0002 0:0526 0:0273
l5 0 0 0 0 0
Table 1. Optimal instrument rule reaction coe¢ cients.
11Woodford considers "commitment in a timeless perspective" which requires any commitment




t￿1 included in the state space form are linearly dependent. To








has been used to express reaction coe¢ cients in terms of y￿
t and y￿
t￿1 only.
l1 ￿ l5 denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with the equations for the forward-looking
variables; (41), (42), (43), (44), and (45) in the appendix. It is due to the speci￿c linear combination
of equations that all reaction coe¢ cients to l5 are zero.
19The table makes it clear that exchange rate targeting in any of the cases under con-
sideration is capable of generating signi￿cant changes in both sign and magnitude
of the optimal reaction coe¢ cients. Though the coe¢ cients are generally di¢ cult to
interpret due to interaction between variables and e⁄ects running through expecta-
tions, Table 1 does reveal several interesting features.
First, it is immediately evident that the optimal policy rate reacts only to vari-
ables that in￿ uence the loss function and are predetermined. This re￿ ects the fact
that the Central Bank responds to all relevant information available at time t.13
The dependence on a set of predetermined Lagrange multipliers associated with
the equations for the forward-looking variables re￿ ects history dependence of the
commitment solution.
Second, and in connection to the previous point since et￿1 a⁄ects et only, the
reaction to lagged nominal exchange rates is negligible unless the nominal exchange
rate level is speci￿cally targeted. The positive coe¢ cient under a peg is also intuitive:
When et￿1 is large, the currency is depreciated, and it is desirable to cause an
appreciation by increasing the policy rate. The negative coe¢ cient on et￿1 when
there is only moderate stabilization is more of a puzzle.
Third, as predicted by UIP (11), the response to foreign interest rate shocks when
there is a large weight on exchange rate targeting is very close to the net impact
on the foreign interest rate: The latter is 0:6141 (in response to a 1% shock),14 and
coe¢ cients on "￿
i;t are respectively 0:6126 and 0:6141. Even when there is less or
no weight on nominal rates is the reaction coe¢ cient between 0:55 and 0:6. This
is an attractive feature of the model, as also empirically interest rate changes in
large countries is important information which often leads to domestic interest rate
13That it is advantageous for the Central Bank to do so is a more general insight: The instrument
should react to variables determining target variables rather than the target variables themselves.
See for instance Svensson (2003) which compares Taylor rules to optimal monetary policy.
14In the foreign interest rate rule (38) below, the foreign reaction coe¢ cient to "￿
i;t is 1 rather than
0:6141. As already mentioned, the latter is what results after taking into account the reduction
in the interest rate from de￿ ation, a negative output gap, and changes in the foreign natural rate.






t, and the ￿ve
latter variables are una⁄ected by "￿
i;t, it is reasonable for the domestic reaction coe¢ cient to be
closer to 0:6141 than 1.
20changes in the same direction.
Fourth, the reaction coe¢ cients on y￿
t￿1 and y￿
t are much larger than on any
domestic variables. This stems to a large degree from the optimality of partly
following movements in the foreign interest rate: Increases in the foreign interest
rate induce a depreciation of the domestic currency unless the small open economy
also tightens its monetary policy. Using (35) and the parameterization of the model,





































t with the rate increasing in the two former and decreasing in the latter
just as in the domestic optimal policy function.
Finally, as is intuitive, the reaction to foreign variables is generally stronger the




under moderate stabilization are the only exceptions.
6 Impulse Responses
To illustrate the impact on the economy of di⁄erences in optimal policies, this sec-
tion considers impulse responses following a one-time shock to the foreign interest
rate of a quarter of a percentage point ("￿
i;0 = 0:25, "￿
i;t = 0 8 t 6= 0). The for-
eign economy response is considered ￿rst, followed by three subsections comparing
respectively moderate stabilization to regimes with di⁄erent weights on the e = 0
target, moderate smoothing to regimes with di⁄erent weights on the et = et￿1 tar-
get, and ￿nally moderate smoothing to moderate stabilization. This allows us to get
a picture of how "fear of ￿ oating" a⁄ects the economy compared to more extreme
cases of exchange rate targeting, and how the type of "fear of ￿ oating" matters.
216.1 The Foreign Economy
The foreign economy disturbance a⁄ects the home country in several ways as previ-
ously discussed: Foreign de￿ ation is transmitted directly to domestic CPI in￿ ation
due to perfect pass through, and the change in foreign output a⁄ects the domestic
economy through risk sharing, export demand and import supply. To understand
the reaction of the domestic economy to the foreign policy shock, it is therefore
important to ￿rst look at the e⁄ect of the disturbance abroad. To this end, this sec-
tion considers impulse responses for the foreign economy as illustrated in Figure 1
below. Because the foreign country is approximately closed, these impulse responses
are independent of the small open economy￿ s policy regime.






















Figure 1. The foreign economy.
From the Figure, it is seen that the immediate e⁄ect of the shock is a rise in the
real interest rate causing recession and de￿ ation. The initial jump in the nominal
rate is less than the shock because of the immediate response of the foreign Central
Bank to de￿ ation, a negative output gap, and a fall in the natural interest rate.
22In the period following the shock, the foreign instrument rate is decreased con-
siderably to stimulate the economy. Slight stimulation continues for several periods,
gradually bringing in￿ ation and output back to their natural levels. Overall, the ad-
justment process lasts around 5 periods for output and slightly longer for in￿ ation.
For the foreign economy, CPI in￿ ation is simply domestic in￿ ation, and consumption
equals production. Hence, these variables also follow the paths outlined in Figure 1.
Though the interest rate setting of the Central Bank looks reasonable, it should
of course be kept in mind that it is the result of a Taylor rule rather than optimal
policy behaviour as modelled for the small open economy. This is also what keeps
the Central Bank from completely o⁄setting the shock in the initial period.
6.2 Moderate Stabilization versus Float and Peg
The consequences of moderate "fear of ￿ oating" with concern for nominal exchange
rate levels are best displayed in comparison with two extreme cases, namely ￿ oating
exchange rates and a peg. The comparison makes evident the cost of stabilization of
the exchange rate level and how that cost is optimally spread over time depending on
the weight given to the exchange rate target in the loss function. Impulse responses
to the foreign interest rate shock under the three regimes are illustrated in Figure
2.
The responses under a ￿ oat and peg are not surprising: The initial monetary
tightening abroad entails a real depreciation of the domestic currency, which under
￿ oating rates results in a nominal depreciation and under a peg is avoided by a
prolonged domestic de￿ ation and recession. Concern for the nominal exchange rate
level induces the return of e to target over time in contrast to the nonstationarity
of the nominal exchange rate under a ￿ oat. As in the foreign country, there is a
tightening of the instrument rate followed by monetary stimulation, making evident
the optimality of keeping the domestic interest rate closely in line with the foreign.
The cost of exchange rate stabilization can also be seen in Figure 2: Under a
peg, there is prolonged domestic and CPI de￿ ation, and an immediate recession
23and larger negative output gap. Though both regimes experience an initial increase
in net exports (not shown) and a fall in consumption, the latter is greater under
the peg due to a larger increase in the interest rate on impact. Overall, though,
the economy is close to stabilized within 10 quarters in both cases, and there is a
permanent nominal depreciation of approximately 0.05 under ￿ oating rates.

















































Figure 2. Moderate stabilization, ￿ oat, and peg.
Turning to moderate stabilization, it is interesting that this case does not necessarily
produce paths of variables inbetween those of the two extremes as one might have
24expected. What happens is rather that it still pays to bring back the nominal
exchange rate to target in the long run, but the recession and de￿ ation necessary to
do so is optimally spread over time to avoid the large initial negative output gap and
CPI de￿ ation of the ￿xed exchange rate regime. Hence, we see an initial nominal
depreciation which is quickly reversed.
As a result, the output impulse response function inherits the hump shape of the
￿ oating regime, but is shifted down so that output is below that of both other regimes
for some periods. Also, domestic de￿ ation decreases smoothly towards zero as under
a peg, but the curve is now less steep. The path of the real exchange rate is much as
under ￿ exible rates, though the real appreciation occurs more quickly to ensure the
return of the nominal rate to target. It is the similarity between real exchange rate
paths under a ￿ oat and moderate stabilization that causes CPI in￿ ation under the
latter regime to also have a downward spike in the quarter immediately following
the shock. As is the case for domestic in￿ ation, the curve is shifted down so that
there is a prolonged de￿ ation in the consumer price index.
In summary, moderately stabilizing the nominal exchange rate causes a smaller
initial recession and higher consumption than under a peg, and smaller real and
nominal exchange rate swings than under a ￿ oat. Also, the nominal exchange rate
is returned to close to target fairly quickly given the relatively small weight devoted
to exchange rate stabilization.
6.3 Moderate Smoothing versus Float and Heavy Smooth-
ing
The comparison of regimes assigning di⁄erent weights to exchange rate smoothing
gives a picture similar to that of the comparison carried out in the previous section.
In particular, the practical di⁄erence between a peg and heavy smoothing is small
because the policy rate under the latter also follows the foreign interest rate closely as
expected from the UIP condition (11). Also, the pursuit of exchange rate smoothing
to a moderate degree decreases the initial output gap and de￿ ation compared to
heavy smoothing as illustrated in Figure 3 below.
25One di⁄erence to the analysis in the previous section is that moderate smooth-
ing produces paths of variables almost inbetween those of the more extreme cases
because the nominal exchange rate is still nonstationary. In fact, the lasting depre-
ciation of the domestic currency is only reduced to approximately 70% of what it is
under a ￿ oat.

















































Figure 3. Moderate smoothing, ￿ oat, and heavy smoothing.
The path of output is much as under heavy smoothing but with a decreased slope.
There is initial de￿ ation which is quickly brought close to zero. CPI in￿ ation displays
26an initial positive value due to the real depreciation, then a negative spike as the real
exchange rate appreciates. There is subsequently a gradual return towards steady
state as swings in domestic in￿ ation and the real exchange rate decrease. Finally,
the real exchange rate follows a path similar to that of a ￿ oating regime, but with
less variability.
The overall e⁄ect of moderately smoothing the exchange rate is thus less initial
de￿ ation and recession than under heavy smoothing, a smaller initial jump in real
and nominal exchange rates, and a smaller permanent depreciation of the domestic
currency than under a ￿ oat.
6.4 Fear of Floating- What is the Di⁄erence?
The results above indicate that exchange rate targeting induces a more stable ex-
change rate at the cost of increased variability in output and in￿ ation. Where the
previous sections have compared di⁄erences in impulse responses resulting from dif-
ferent weigths on the same policy objective, this section takes the analysis a step
further by looking at di⁄erences in impulse responses arising from assigning the same
moderate weight to di⁄erent exchange rate targets. Figure 4 illustrates the paths of
important variables under the two types of "fear of ￿ oating" outlined above.
Most obviously, there is great variation in the impulse response of the nominal
exchange rate, which is brought back on target in the long run under stabilization,
but is nonstationary and allowed to permanently depreciate under smoothing. The
optimality of bringing the nominal exchange rate back on target under moderate
stabilization causes the recession and domestic de￿ ation to be more pronounced,
and the real exchange rate to appreciate and return to steady state faster than
under smoothing. For the Central Bank, the cost of pursuing stabilization is mainly
in terms of increased CPI-deviations from target for the entire simulation period.
There is also an increase in the initial output gap.
In summary, the nature of "fear of ￿ oating" determines whether monetary policy
should primarily be used to bring back the nominal exchange rate to zero (while
27also caring for in￿ ation and output), or to stabilize in￿ ation and output (while also
keeping nominal exchange rate swings low).












































Figure 4. Fear of Floating.
7 Conclusion
In a Small Open Economy Model, it is demonstrated how targeting the nominal
exchange rate in levels or ￿rst di⁄erences a⁄ects the economy. In particular, the
paper considers optimal policy and impulse responses following a shock to the foreign
28interest rate under ￿ve alternative regimes: 1) A pure ￿ oat, 2) A peg, 3) Heavy
smoothing, 4) Moderate stabilization, and 5) Moderate smoothing.
It is found that even moderate exchange rate concerns are capable of turning
around the sign of reaction coe¢ cients to both domestic and foreign variables in the
optimal policy rule, and that the absolute value of the response to foreign variables
is usually increasing in the weight attached to nominal exchange rates. An attractive
feature of the model is that the instrument is kept close to the foreign rate under
every regime, and especially so under a peg and heavy smoothing as predicted by
UIP. The fact that optimal policy reacts to all relevant information is evident in
the instrument rule having nonzero coe¢ cients on all variables a⁄ecting the loss
function under each regime, and zero coe¢ cients on all other variables.
The cost of exchange rate targeting is also evident in the model. However,
though "fear of ￿ oating" generally stabilizes exchange rates at the cost of output
and in￿ ation compared to a ￿ oat, impulse responses are not simply inbetween those
of a pure ￿ oat and regimes assigning more weight to the exchange rate target. For
instance, the recession and de￿ ation necessary to bring the nominal exchange rate
back on target under moderate stabilization is optimally spread over time compared
to a peg to avoid part of the initial de￿ ation and decrease in output.
Because even a small weight on exchange rate stabilization makes it optimal to
bring back the nominal exchange rate to zero, the nature of "fear of ￿ oating" has
much impact on the focus of monetary policy. In particular, monetary policy can
stabilize CPI-in￿ ation and the output gap better under moderate smoothing because
it need not generate a nominal appreciation to make up for the initial jump in the
nominal exchange rate. The result is much smaller CPI-deviations from target for
the entire simulation period and a decrease in the initial output gap.
The general framework presented in the paper lends itself to several extensions.
Most importantly, realism could be increased by imposing predeterminedness of
output and in￿ ation, imperfect pass through, and by considering discretionary policy
rather than commitment. The latter is especially important if a large part of the
29concern for currency instability is attributable to lack of credibility (as for instance
Calvo and Reinhart (2000) argue could be the case for emerging markets). It would
then also be sensible to close the model by assuming a risk premium on small open
economy borrowing rather than risk sharing.
An interesting theoretical extension is to construct a fully optimizing framework
by allowing the Foreign Central Bank to also optimize subject to the full rational
expectations model and discretion. To understand whether the decrease in exchange
rate variability is worth the costs, one must make welfare calculations based on
approximations to the representative consumer￿ s utility in a model that explicitly
takes into account the reasons to care about exchange rates.
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329 Appendix
9.1 State space form and loss function
This subsection shows how the model equations (29) ￿ (36) can be rewritten in the
























where t ￿ 0; Xt+1 is an nX vector of predetermined variables (variables with
exogenous one-period-ahead forecast error) with X0 given, xt is an nx vector of
forward-looking variables, it is the instrument, and "t+1 is an n" vector of exogenous
zero-mean iid shocks as described in Svensson (2005). The matrices A and B are
partitioned conformably with Xt and xt.






































The covariance matrix of "t is assumed to be the identity matrix for the solution
method to be valid. In particular, shocks are assumed to be uncorrelated.15
To obtain the state space form, simply rewrite the equations of the domestic and
foreign economies separately. De￿ning the composite parameters
￿0 ￿ ￿ + h(￿ ￿ 1)
￿1 ￿ ￿ (2 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1) + 1
￿2 ￿ ￿’￿1 ￿ ￿
15Because the model is linear-quadratic there is certainty equivalence and the optimal policy is
independent of the variance of shocks.





































































































t￿1 ￿ ￿ (’ + ￿)y
￿








































































































where for simplicity the natural foreign interest rate has been substituted out.
The domestic economy requires slightly more algebra due to the unusual form
where it has not been possible to simply substitute out the terms of trade. The
resulting state space form is therefore slightly messy. Use the relations
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￿h(￿ ￿ 1)(2 ￿ ￿)
￿1
st￿1
to obtain the state space form equations
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1 + ￿





















































































0 = ￿yt ￿￿y
￿
t ￿h(￿ ￿ 1)yt￿1 +h(￿ ￿ 1)y
￿
t￿1 +h(￿ ￿ 1)(2 ￿ ￿)￿st￿1 ￿￿1st (45)
yt =
￿￿1 (’ + 1)
￿2
at +















(2 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)￿h
￿2
st￿1
Also, use the fact that from (27), et = et￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)st ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)st￿1 + ￿t ￿ ￿￿
t. It
then easily follows that the matrices H;A;B;C de￿ning the system are given by
35A11 =
2
6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6
4
1 0 0 0 0 ￿ ￿ 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(￿￿1)h’
(￿+’)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0







0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0
￿(’+1)(￿a￿1)
’+￿ 0 1 ￿
￿
h(￿ ￿ 1) + 1
2
￿
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
￿￿1(’+1)
￿2 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
￿a 0 0 0 0 0
0 ￿￿ 0 0 0 0
0 0 ￿a 0 0 0
0 0 0 ￿￿ 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0
(’+1)￿a
’+￿ 0 0 0
3
7 7
7 7 7 7 7 7
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To complete the state space form, the period loss function, Lt; must be expressed









and a weighting matrix ￿ so that Lt = 1
2Y 0
t￿Yt.
In the current model, the loss function is quadratic in the terms ￿
cpi
t ;yt￿yt;et￿
et￿1 and et.16 To get the model into the desired form, rewrite these variables as
￿
cpi
t = ￿t + ￿st ￿ ￿st￿1
yt ￿ yt = yt +
￿1 (’ + 1)
￿2
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(2 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)￿h
￿2
st￿1
et ￿ et￿1 = (1 ￿ ￿)st ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)st￿1 ￿ ￿
￿
t + ￿t
et = et￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)st ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)st￿1 + ￿t ￿ ￿
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t
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0 0 0 0 0 ￿(1 ￿ ￿) 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 ￿(1 ￿ ￿) 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 ￿ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 ￿
(2￿￿)(￿￿1)￿￿
￿2 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 ￿ ￿ ￿1 0 0




16The Matlab programme accompanying this paper also allows a nonzero weight on interest rate






￿cpi 0 0 0
0 ￿y 0 0
0 0 ￿￿" 0




9.2 Model Solution Under Commitment









subject to the model (39) when the Central Bank can commit and hence solve the
problem once and for all in the initial period. I use the Recursive Saddlepoint
Method of Marcet and Marimon as described in Svensson (2005).17 The main idea
of this method is to reformulate the problem (46) as a recursive problem to which
solutions to the standard linear quadratic regulator problem can be applied.
Under initial conditions X0 = X0, this is done by ￿rst setting up the Lagrangian










t+1 (Xt+1 ￿ A11Xt ￿ A12xt ￿ B1it ￿ C"t+1)
+￿0











Here, ￿t+1 is the nX vector of forwardlooking Lagrange multipliers corresponding to
the upper block of the model equations, ie the predetermined variables, while ￿t is
the nx vector of predetermined Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the remaining
nx model equations.













s.t. Xt+1 = A11Xt + A12xt + B1it + C"t+1
￿t = &t
X0 = X0;￿￿1 = 0
17See also Marcet and Marimon (1998).
39where e Lt is the modi￿ed loss function e Lt ￿ Lt + &0
t (￿A21Xt ￿ A22xt ￿ B2it) +
1
￿￿0
t￿1Hxt, and that the standard solution for the linear quadratic regulator problem
can be used. Mathematically, this is done by solving the Riccati equation
e V = Q + ￿ e A
0e V e A ￿
￿
￿ e B




0e V e B + R
￿￿1 ￿
￿ e B





































and W￿￿ are de￿ned by partitioning the matrix W ￿ D0￿D conformably with Xt;xt,















































, Fx is the nx top rows of the matrix F, Fi denotes the
subsequent ni rows of F, ni is the number of instruments (=1), M ￿ e A + e BF; and




0e V e B + R
￿￿1 ￿
￿ e B
0e V e A + N
0
￿
The system can be written more compactly as Zt = AZt￿1 + C"t+1 where the
de￿nition of the matrices A and C should be obvious from (47). In the current
model, the vector Zt contains mainly variables dated at time t (since many variables
in the vector Xt+1 are lagged one period to make them predetermined). However,
the variables a;￿w;a￿;￿￿w;"￿
i; and y￿are timed at t + 1. The bottom row of (47) is
the optimal policy function.
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